Chico Peace and Justice Center

A Position Paper on Afghanistan
Chico Peace and Justice Center Board of Directors
Adopted 15 April 2009

 In an effort to serve our work for peace and justice through offering information and recommending courses of action on crucial contemporary issues, the Chico Peace and Justice Center presents the following position paper, with supporting material attached, for the consideration and active response of our Chico community.

Background considerations:

Afghanistan has a three millennium history of invasion by foreign powers, none of these successful in the long run.  The United States now stands in this tradition, a country itself burdened by persistent but failing efforts at military invasion in Vietnam and Iraq in recent decades. 

The escalation of an already failing effort does not promise success, and the reluctance of other parties to increase their own military involvement registers their reading of this wasteful strategy as well.  The recommendations of military leaders, naturally, assumes that military force is the means to be applied, but the problems of Afghanistan —and there are many—are not amenable to a military solution. 

U.S. intervention, shaped as it has been by the events of 9/11 and the political and economic interests of the United States in that region, has not served the people of Afghanistan; indeed, it has wreaked havoc on the lives of Afghan citizens and their property. 

The current administration has not been sufficiently clear about objectives in Afghanistan and the role of this country in Afghanistan’s future.  In fact, the US presence and military actions have made it more difficult for Afghanis to negotiate their own internal differences and come to terms with these tensions in arriving at social stability. 

Private contractors employed in the American effort there—double the number of military personnel—function outside of national and international laws and are not held accountable to the American people they are seen to represent.  The immense cost of the war represents enormous needs unmet in our own society; the CPJC campaign, “Beyond War: A New Economy is Possible,” has offered innumerable arguments for demilitarizing the budget and redirecting the day-to-day military budget ($530 billion proposed for 2010) and war supplements ($130 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan) to humane causes both here and abroad. 

Finally, while this military effort may often be referred to as the NATO alliance at work, the numbers and the decision-making power reveal it is clearly a US effort seeking legitimacy through the participation of smaller numbers of allies—a pattern we have seen in the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq.

The Board of Directors of the Chico Peace and Justice Center therefore calls for a new direction in Afghan policy, including specific actions in the following four areas:

Military
We call for an immediate moratorium on additional troop placement in Afghanistan, and an immediate halt to drone and other air strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  This should be followed by cautious withdrawal of all existing foreign troops in Afghanistan including removal of private contractors and mercenaries, taking particular care to protect civilians.

Nation Building
We call for full reparation to Afghanistan for damages to the country and a nonpartisan study of Afghanistan conducted by specialists free of political, economic, or military bias (e.g., a task force of the United Nations).  We support peace efforts conducted through existing Afghani organizations, including the Afghan women’s association and other peace groups and nonviolent resistance organizations, and we support alliances formed with the Afghan people rather than with elite or dominant political and religious groups.  We encourage regional solutions that attempt to stabilize the Middle East through diplomacy rather than economic or military threats and an unbiased effort to discover what the Afghan people want for the future of their country, coupled with a genuine effort on the part of the U.S. to respond to that citizen expression of needs.  This will require, and we support, a major effort to assist Afghanis in developing their institutions, and a concerted focus on economic and social development in Afghanistan. We call for a “surge” in humanitarian support rather than military occupation, a “surge” in offering educational opportunities to Afghani people, and respect for civilian rule and law in Afghanistan, in accordance with internationally accepted views of human rights.

International Community
We call for a commitment from the U.S. to join with and to respect the international community in remediating conditions in Afghanistan, acknowledging and supporting its cultural autonomy, and restoring its rightful independence. We also call on the Afghani people and their leaders to adhere to widely accepted values as expressed in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We also call for strict adherence to international law by the United States and its allies.  We recommend leadership development among tribal leaders and an effort to develop local leadership, recognizing that local traditions and needs alone can create local solutions, in particular in rural areas.  We call for international support consistent with human rights and a refusal to treat Afghanistan as a pawn in global affairs, in particular in struggles for military dominance and competition for possession of oil and gas reserves and pipelines.

U.S. Citizen Debate
We call for promotion of a genuine public discussion at home so that the will of the American people, rather than the priorities of political and military leaders, may form a humane, democratic, and compassionate approach to foreign policy in Afghanistan.

Supporting material:

Historical Background of Afghanistan
Historian Arnold Toynbee once described Afghanistan as “the roundabout of the ancient world” because of its geographical location: on the ancient silk road between China, the Middle East, and Europe and on a north-south path between Russian and India.  It has been variously invaded and temporarily occupied by the Aryans, Medes, Persians, Greeks, Mauryans, Kushans, Sassanians, Arabs, Turks, British, and Soviets. (Most notable among its previous and unsuccessful invaders were Alexander the Great and Ghengis Khan.)  Beginning in the 19^th century, what historians call “The Great Game” was played in Afghanistan, with both Russian and Britain seeking to control Afghanistan as a buffer: for the British, to protect access to their Indian empire, for the Russians, to protect perceived threats to the motherland. The British fought three wars in Afghanistan in 1839-42, 1878-80, and 1919, the final “Anglo-Afghan” war leading to Afghan independence. 

A “New Great Game” was launched following World War II with the United States and Russia treating Afghanistan as a pawn in the Cold War.  In the late 1970s, anti-communist mujahedeen rebelled against the then-ruling Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops invaded to protect the Communist influence. However, in anticipation, President Jimmy Carter had authorized CIA overt propaganda efforts against the Marxist regime, and in his memoir, From the Shadows, current U. S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates says that the U.S. began assisting the rebel forces six months before the Russian action.

President Carter’s security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, is credited with being the architect of U.S. policy during that period, and he boasted in a 1998 interview: “We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would…”  Brzezinski added that U.S. actions “had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap….The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. ‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War’.” 

The United States also provided training for the guerilla groups opposing the Russian invasion, and this included the politically and religiously conservative Taliban, even Osama Bin Laden, who was effectively on the U.S. payroll in the cold war against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet invasion was no more successful than the American misadventure in Vietnam, leading to withdrawal in 1989. In an interview with BBC’s Richard Galpin on the 20^th anniversary of the withdrawal, Russian veteran Lt. Gen. Ruslan Aushev said "We were there for 10 years and we lost more than 14,000 soldiers, but what was the result? Nothing…We wanted to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, but in fact everything got worse.”

The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was regarded by the U.S. as a major cold war victory and, more broadly, as partly responsible for the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

U. S. Intervention in Afghanistan
The Taliban, trained in part by the United States, obtained power in Afghanistan in 1996 and initiated its campaign of imposing strict interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban is also widely acknowledged to have provided safe haven for Obama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Thus U.S. intervention in Afghan affairs in the late 1980s has ironically and catastrophically created a new enemy of former allies and trainees, the Taliban.

Political ideology aside, Afghanistan is also a “roundabout” for world gas and oil supplies, located close to major gas and oil reserves and proposed pipeline development. Major western global oil companies and their clients thus have a considerable stake in controlling the country. Michael Klare, author of the book Resource Wars, interviewed by Radio Free Europe, said:

           "I think in this case this is a national security consideration that's driving all of this. The United States has to get that oil from that region [Central Asia] and will make a deal with whatever governments are there in place that are willing to work with us [that is, the US], like the government[s] in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan that are far from ideal with respect to human rights and democratic procedure. And I think that's a reflection of the view that I write about in my book—we [the US] view oil as a security consideration and we have to protect it by any means necessary, regardless of other considerations, other values."

In 2009, after eight years of U.S. overt engagement, an estimated 33,000 American troops are presently in Afghanistan under a NAT0-sponsored initiative of which the U.S. is the dominant contributor.  The Obama administration has also committed an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan. A March 22, 2009 Associated Press report also notes that “Currently, there are 71,700 contractors in Afghanistan, which is more than twice the number of U.S. troops.” As of spring 2009, almost six hundred U.S. soldiers had been killed in the operation.  Civilian casualties are conservatively estimated at twice or three times that.

The Taliban has been replaced by the elected government of Hamid Karzai, but that ersatz democratic government has widely been seen as ineffectual.   Attempts to locate and remove terrorists from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area have been largely ineffectual as well.

The Obama Administration’s Position on Afghanistan
Candidate and now-President Barack Obama has been consistently in support of the U.S. undeclared war in Afghanistan.  In 2008, on the 5^th Anniversary of the Iraq war, Candidate Obama declared,

The war in Iraq has emboldened the Taliban, which has rebuilt its strength since we took our eye off of Afghanistan….The central front in the war against terror is not Iraq, and it never was. What more could America's enemies ask for than an endless war where they recruit new followers and try out new tactics on a battlefield so far from their base of operations? That is why my presidency will shift our focus. Rather than fight a war that does not need to be fought, we need to start fighting the battles that need to be won on the central front of the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Neither the candidate nor the President has made it particularly clear how the Afghanistan campaign is anything other than “an endless war where [America’s enemies] recruit new followers and try out new tactics on a battlefield so far from [our] base of operations.”

In a February 2009 interview with PBS’s Jim Lehrer, the President continued to be adamant about the perceived need for military action but also confessed that the goals for Afghanistan are unclear:

JIM LEHRER: And you also said in your speech that it's one of the lessons of Iraq is that there are clearly defined goals. What are the goals for Afghanistan right now?

BARACK OBAMA: Well, I don't think that they're clear enough, that's part of the problem. We've seen a sense of drift in the mission in Afghanistan, and that's why I've ordered a head-to-toe, soup-to-nuts review of our approach in Afghanistan.

Now, I can articulate some very clear, minimal goals in Afghanistan, and that is that we make sure that it's not a safe haven for Al Qaida, they are not able to launch attacks of the sort that happened on 9/11 against the American homeland or American interest. How we achieve that initial goal, what kinds of strategies and tactics we need to put in place, I don't think that we've thought it through, and we haven't used the entire arsenal of American power.

We've been thinking very militarily, but we haven't been as effective in thinking diplomatically, we haven't been thinking effectively around the development side of the equation, you know, what are we doing to replace poppy crops for Afghans that allow them to support themselves. Obviously, we haven't been thinking regionally, recognizing that Afghanistan is actually an Afghanistan/Pakistan problem, because right now the militants, the extremists who are attacking U.S. troops are often times coming over the border from Pakistan.

So that's why we've assigned an envoy, Richard Holbrooke, to work comprehensively in the region, and this review that we're talking about should be completed by the middle of next month. I will then be reporting to the American people and Congress about how exactly we are going to be moving forward in Afghanistan.

Despite the acknowledged lack of clear goals, on the same day as the Lehrer interview, President Obama also told news media via a speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, that 17,000 more American troops would be sent to Afghanistan shortly, with more to follow, likely doubling the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and putting as many troops there as the “residual” force of 50,000 to be left in Iraq.

The President’s “head-to-toe, soup-to-nuts” survey of conditions in Afghanistan and the region in order to clarify U.S. objectives, conducted by longtime professional diplomat Richard Holbrooke, was unveiled to the public in March 2009, after only one month of study. As could have been predicted, it emphasizes a “regional solution,” including Pakistan, and the use of diplomacy along with military strength. According to the President "What we're looking for is a comprehensive strategy. And there's got to be an exit strategy ... There's got to be a sense that this is not perpetual drift."  However, the only firm element of the March 2009 plan was confirmation of the intent to send 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. In short, Holbrooke’s “study” had the net effect of reinforcing what the President has had in mind since he became a candidate.

And it is important to recall the President’s thinly veiled threat in the Lehrer interview that “we haven't used the entire arsenal of American power.”

Responses to the U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
While the Obama administration has presented a more-or-less unified response to the war in Afghanistan—diplomacy and a regional solution backed up with a surge in a military and mercenary presence in Afghanistan—alternative views of both the “problem” and proposed “solutions” abound.

In a February article in Global Researcher, Peter Symonds reported that:

The top US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, warned on Wednesday [February 18, 2009] that the huge boost to US troop numbers announced this week would have to continue for years. His comments underscore the fact that the Obama administration is preparing for a dramatic escalation of the war in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan that will inevitably heighten tensions throughout the region, especially in Central Asia.

In the BBC interview on the anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal (2/14/09), Russian Col. Oleg Kulakov said, drawing on his two tours of duty in Afghanistan: "Doubling [the U.S.] forces won't lead to a solution on the ground. The conflict cannot be solved by military means, it's an illusion. No one can reach any political goal in Afghanistan relying on military force. Frankly speaking, they are doomed to repeat our mistakes."

A new Rand Corporation study by Seth Jones:

… explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.

A statement by Pax Christi observes that foreign actions in Afghanistan have created “a trail of resentment and hatred” and argues that a “surge” in military activities in Afghanistan “will only inflame violence in the region, putting at greater risk U.S. and Afghan lives—without building the deeper foundations for a long-term peace.” 

The Friends Committee on National Legislation suggests that “rather than continuing to lead with the military in Afghanistan, the U.S. should invest in regional diplomacy and improved assistance to strengthen civilian rule of law and stimulate development and peace building.”

United for Peace and Justice observes: “Instead of escalation, we call for U.S. troops to be brought home and a commitment to negotiated diplomatic solutions that are just and that do not endanger the rights and future of the Afghan people. Instead of war and occupation, the U.S. should be working for greater cooperation and collective security for all of the people of the region.”

The resolutions of the Chico Peace and Justice Center described in this paper add to the peace-driven alternatives available to President Obama and the world. We urge a reversal of the irrational and counterproductive military invasion of Afghanistan and pursuit of peaceful solutions that respect universal human rights.

References

Associated Press. “US Military Deaths in Afghanistan Region at 589.”  March 9, 2009.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5g3dO01zk6vBUdavNiW-Zfe-SJuvQD96QQF580

Atal, Subodth.  “At a Crossroads in Afghanistan: Should the U.S. Be Involved in National Building?”  The Cato Institute. Report 81, February 2003. 

BBC Country Profile: Afghanistan.  February 25, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/country_profiles/1162668.stm

Flaherty, Anne. “Military hangs `Help Wanted' sign in Afghanistan.”  Associated Press. March 22, 2009. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ivTscD0Sy3hJdvyYgLFsJ_P-B_XwD9732JS80

Flanders, Jon.  Oil, Gas, and Afghanistan. http://members.localnet.com/~jeflan/jfafghanpipe.htmj

Friends Committee on National Legislation.  Letter to President Barack Obama. February 18, 2009.

Galpin, Richard.  BBC reports, “Russians warn of Afghan Parallels.”  February 14, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7888566.stm

Hindu Website. “A Brief History of Afghanistan.” www.hinduwebsite.com/

Jones, Seth. Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan.   The Rand Corporation Counter-Insurgency Study. Volume 4. 2009. www.rand.org/

Klein, Kent. “Obama: Afghanistan Policies Under Review.” Voice of America News. 10 February 2009. www.voanews.com

Pax Christi.  Statement on Afghanistan. Spring 2009. http://www.paxchristiusa.org/AfghanistanStatement2009.asp

Symonds, Peter.  “US Commander Warns American Troops Will Be in Afghanistan for Years.”  Global Researcher. February 21, 2009.  http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12396

Traynor, Ian, and Jon Boone. “Barack Obama's troubleshooter Richard Holbrooke unveils strategy to halt Afghanistan 'drift'.” The Guardian. March 24, 2009.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/24/richard-holbrooke-taliban-afghanistan-hamid-karzai/print

United for Peace and Justice.  Position on Afghanistan. www.ufpj.org

United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html